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TAB BC

### COMMUNIST BY CAPABILITIES IN KOREA THE KOREAN AREA

#### OFFENSIVE

the Communists

There is no proof of Chinese Communist or North Korean

biological research for the express purpose of waging biological waron
fare. Available intelligence of Communist HW capabilities in the

Korean area is almost entirely concerned with possible CCF activities,
although it must be assumed that some technical interchange takes place
the Communists
between Chinese and North Koreans.



- 2. Intelligence indicates that the Chinese Communist Government may have established a small, basic, and applied laboratory EW research program. This program is probably carried out in three scientific institutes located in North China and Manchuria. Research appears to be centered on enteric diseases of man and selected food-crop-killing hormones.
- 3. Top control of the BW research program probably rests in the "Chinese Communist Military Council"; technical assistance is obtained from specialists in the various research institutes. Control by the Council is exercised through three main scientific institutes in areas where the requisite laboratory facilities are already available for biological research. The principal institutes are at Peiping; (Peiping Scientific Research Institute); Chang Chun (The People's Army Chemical Warfare School and Research Laboratory under the Northeast Scientific

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Institute); and Peian (Paichia Special Diseases Research Institute).

Other institutes possibly connected with the Chinese Communist program are located at Harbin (branch of the Continental Scientific Research Institute); Mukden(Cattle Disease Research Institute); and Dairen (the Dairen Sanitary Research Laboratory).

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## The Chinese HW program, intimately related to MH CW program,
Non
is reported to be closely supervised and supported by the USSR. \*\*SUPPLY\*
Chinese are prominent in the research program. Soviet
personnel participate as directors of the principal laboratories, and as
many as 50% of the are reportedly Soviet. In addition,
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technical personnel are reported to the integrated into the from the former Kwantung Army BW units have been put to the program by the Chinese Communists.

5. Reported work of these facilities and scientists cover bubonic plague, typhoid, cholera, and other intestinal diseases. The Chang Chun institute has facilities closely associated with airfields; however, there is no evidence to confirm or deny actual employment of aircraft in munition or agent tests. Likewise, there is no evidence from the other research centers to indicate pilot-plant or large-scale BW protesting duction, field testing of agents, or development and that of BW munitions and equipment.

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6. Recent tests by the/Army Chemical Corps have served to area illustrate the ease with which limited/targets can be attacked with EW agents. In view of the results of these tests, it seems probable that the Communists could, in limited areas, sabotage South Korean crops, wells, municipal water systems, and populated points targets with EW agents.

#### DEFENSIVE

- 7. BW defensive capabilities are closely tied to the public health system, medical facilities, and medical supplies. In China and Korea all three are very poor. The Communists are attempting to improve these in their basic public health program;/such improvement, when realized, will be of value in combating BW.
- sion of epidemic control and prevention units, and/expenditure of large sums for medical and sanitation work. Although inoculations against contagious diseases have been reported, it is doubtful if a significant percentage of the population has been protected. Many CCF PW's in Korea report/inoculations are incomplete or entirely omitted. The Soviets have been aiding and advising the Communists in China / Manchuria particularly and advising the Communists in China / Manchuria particularly and advising the communists in China / Soviet interest is primarily benevolent or is associated with the EW program is not known.

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9. It is possible that Soviet developments in BW equipment and munitions might be made available (at least in design) to the Communists in Korea if it was determined that BW should be employed. However, in view of the Communists' relatively poor defensive capability visea-vis US defensive capability, large-scale employment of BW with Soviet munitions, agents, and the necessary concurrent air superiority, is considered highly unlikely.